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THE CHAPTER 11 FINANCIAL ADVISORS 
Stephen J. Lubben* 
It has been observed that large chapter 11 cases have become increasingly 
“professionalized.”1 In particular, while debtor’s counsel might once have 
handled the bulk of the reorganization, the debtor now routinely retains 
specialized professionals to address specific aspects of its case.2 
Among the most controversial of these non-legal professionals have been 
the financial advisors, as they often earn transaction fees based on either the 
sale or reorganization of the debtor.3 Financial advisors are typically 
compensated with a combination of flat monthly fees and outcome-contingent 
transactional fees, and thus fit uneasily into the chapter 11 system, which is 
largely dominated by lawyers and former lawyers acting as judges, both of 
whom are most accustomed to billing hourly rates plus expenses.4 And then, of 
course, the most vocal commentators on professional fees are also lawyers, in 
the form of law professors.5 
 
 * Daniel J. Moore Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. This paper is based on my 
dissertation prepared for the Ph.D. program at the University of Groningen, Department of Law and 
Economics, which is in turn based in part on data gathered by the author as part of the ABI Chapter 11 
Professional Fee Study, funded by a grant from the American Bankruptcy Institute, the ABI Endowment Fund, 
and the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges. I am grateful for the ABI and NCBJ’s assistance with this 
project. All conclusions are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the ABI, the NCBJ, or their 
members. 
 1 See Jo Ann Brighton et al., For Better or Worse: Chapter 11 in the Post-BAPCPA Downturn, 7 
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 555, 578–79 (2009). 
 2 Id.  
 3 See, e.g., In re Hillsborough Holdings Corp., 125 B.R. 837 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) (disapproving 
interim fee applications submitted by Bear Sterns Co., Inc., the Committee’s financial advisor); Linda Sandler, 
Lehman Pays Its Bankruptcy Advisers $262.6 Million for 9 Months, BLOOMBERG, July 9, 2009, 12:01 AM, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=apzbxu6eOxik (describing the lucrative fees paid 
to the financial advisors of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.). 
 4 Michael L. Cook & Stephen J. Lubben, Retention, Payment, Ethical and Other Obstacles for Non-
Legal Professionals in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, in ETHICS IN CONTEXT, at 175, 181–82 (PLI N.Y. Practice 
Skills, Course Handbook Ser. No. 66, 1999) (“Courts throughout the country differ in their views of non-legal 
professionals. Retention arrangements that are routinely approved in Manhattan and Wilmington may be met 
with skepticism, if not outright hostility, in Los Angeles, Denver, or Tampa.”). 
 5 See, e.g., LYNN M. LOPUCKI & JOSEPH W. DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES IN CORPORATE 
BANKRUPTCIES: DATA, ANALYSIS, AND EVALUATION 120 (2011) (“Financial advisors often do a substantial 
portion of their work prior to the filing of the petition. In some instances, they seek payment for that work after 
the filing of the petition. That practice is improper, both because the estate has no right or obligation to pay 
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It may be that attorneys are poor observers of other professionals’ fee 
structures and general business practices. But given the increasing importance 
of financial advisors in chapter 11 and other reorganization schemes, the need 
for some evidence of how these advisors influence chapter 11 costs is 
increasing as well. 
This short Article begins the discussion by considering a sample of 
financial advisors involved in chapter 11 cases filed in 2004. Part I of the 
Article describes the dataset and the types of financial advisors that routinely 
appear in chapter 11 cases. Part II provides some basic descriptive statistics 
regarding these financial advisors, and it also provides a brief discussion of the 
types of professionals that routinely appear in chapter 11 cases beyond 
bankruptcy counsel. Among other things, Part II shows that financial advisors, 
although receiving much attention and criticism, actually cost slightly less, on 
average, than the debtor’s bankruptcy attorneys. 
Part III then models the costs of financial advisors. In this Part, I find that 
cost increases if both the debtor and the committee retain financial advisors. 
Costs also increase with the contentiousness of the case, which I suggest 
reflects a tendency to focus on the large, lump-sum fees earned by financial 
advisors in such cases. 
Part IV of the Article then turns to look at the specific issue of debtor-
retained financial advisors, as they make up the bulk of financial advisor cost 
in chapter 11.6 Here, the most interesting finding is that the size of the debtor 
matters, whereas it does not seem to matter when financial advisors are 
considered in the aggregate. This again suggests the importance of a finer 
understanding of the workings of financial advisors and what they actually 
“do.” 
Part V of the Article wraps up by considering the legal and policy 
implications of these findings. In particular, I note how poorly the Bankruptcy 
Code, as drafted in 1978, is suited to the types of compensation structures that 
financial advisors and turnaround consultants typically receive. Looking 
specifically at § 328(a), I argue that it may be time to revamp large parts of the 
Code to reflect the reality of modern chapter 11 practice. 
 
pre-petition unsecured debt and because the court can award compensation only to ‘a professional employed 
under [§] 327.’” (footnote omitted)). 
 6 See infra Table 3. 
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I. THE DATASET 
I begin with the dataset I collected for the American Bankruptcy Institute’s 
(ABI) Chapter 11 Fee Study.7 This dataset includes cases that were originally 
filed in 2004, and the data within each case comes from publicly available 
court filings that were primarily collected from Public Access to Court 
Electronic Records (PACER).8 
The dataset is non-random, comprising of nearly all 2004 bankruptcy cases 
listed in the “Major Bankruptcies” database on BankruptcyData.com.9 
Excluded from the dataset are all cases initially filed under chapter 7 and never 
converted to chapter 11, along with all cases filed under former § 304 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.10 
Two broad types of professional fee data were collected: debtor 
professional expenses and committee professional expenses. In particular, 
under § 330 of the Bankruptcy Code and under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy 
Procedure 2016, all professionals retained by either the debtor or an official 
committee (most often a creditors’ committee) must file fee applications with 
the court before they can be paid from estate funds.11 A similar rule applies to 
professionals retained by examiners or trustees,12 and the datasets also include 
 
 7 The American Bankruptcy Institute’s Chapter 11 Fee Study is available online. Stephen J. Lubben, 
ABI Chapter 11 Fee Study (Seton Hall Pub. Law Research Paper No. 1020477, 2007), available at http://ssrn. 
com/abstract=1020477. The study is extensively discussed in Stephen J. Lubben, Corporate Reorganization & 
Professional Fees, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 77 (2008) [hereinafter Lubben, Corporate Reorganization]. 
 8 PACER is available at http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/. For more on conducting empirical research of 
bankruptcy cases through PACER, see Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Empirical Research in Consumer 
Bankruptcy, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2123, 2148 (2002). 
 9 New Generation Research, Bankruptcy Search, BANKRUPTCYDATA.COM, www.bankruptcydata.com/ 
findabrtop.asp (last visited Aug. 12, 2011).  
 10 See 11 U.S.C. § 304 (2000), repealed by Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 802(d)(3), 119 Stat. 23, 146. Section 304 was repealed in 2005 as part of the 
enactment of the new chapter 15. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 713, 
718–20 (2005). Both § 304 and the new chapter 15 deal with the recognition of foreign bankruptcy 
proceedings in the United States. See generally id.  
 11 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) (2006) (permitting a bankruptcy court to compensate professionals who have 
previously been retained by the estate); FED. R. BANKR. P. 2016(a) (“An entity seeking interim or final 
compensation for services, or reimbursement of necessary expenses, from the estate shall file an application 
setting forth a detailed statement of (1) the services rendered, time expended and expenses incurred, and (2) 
the amounts requested.”).  
 12 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) (permitting fees for a professional person employed by a trustee subject to 
§ 327). The Code does not expressly provide for an examiner to retain professionals, but courts have typically 
assumed they have such powers. 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1106.05[3] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. 
Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2011); see also In re Mirant Corp., 354 B.R. 113, 147–48 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006); In 
re Southmark Corp., 113 B.R. 280, 281–82 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990). 
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that information. Bankruptcy-related professional fees incurred in the days just 
before the bankruptcy filing are reported on the debtor’s statement of financial 
affairs and thus are also included in the dataset. Professional fees incurred by 
creditors who have a contractual right to charge such fees to the debtor—such 
as secured lenders—are not included in the dataset, inasmuch as these sorts of 
reimbursement obligations are not subject to § 330 and are therefore not 
subject to express disclosure.13 
The present study modifies the original ABI dataset in several key respects. 
For example, in the original study, each case was followed for two years or 
until it ceased to be in chapter 11 because either a plan was confirmed, the case 
was converted to chapter 7, or the case was dismissed.14 I took this approach 
with the data due to the required timeline for producing the final report for the 
ABI Chapter 11 Fee Study. 
To examine whether this censoring had any effect on the data, I revisited 
the cases that were still pending in chapter 11 when the original study was 
completed and re-coded them to include their final resolution and all 
professional expenses incurred through that resolution.15 
Additionally, I revamped my approach to measuring the debtor’s assets and 
liabilities in the dataset, which previously had been taken only from the 
debtor’s schedules. First, when available, asset and liability information was 
obtained from Bloomberg Professional.16 Typically, this information came 
from the company’s most recent pre-bankruptcy SEC filings, but Bloomberg 
also provides financial information for certain larger privately held companies 
in the sample (e.g., Tower Records). Then, only if financial information on the 
debtor was unavailable on Bloomberg, assets and liability information was 
taken from the debtor’s schedules. This change was made for a variety of 
reasons, most notably to reduce the risk that debtor size—a key factor in the 
present study—would be misspecified for the corporate groups in the dataset, 
since schedules are often filed on a corporation-by-corporation basis, whereas 
chapter 11 costs are typically incurred by the group as a whole. 
 
 13 These professionals are not retained by the estate and thus not subject to the terms of § 330(a)(1). 
Instead, their claim for compensation is folded into the creditor’s overall claim again the estate. See generally 
Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of America v. Pac. Gas & Electric Co., 549 U.S. 443 (2007) (allowing creditor’s 
claim for attorney’s fees under an indemnification agreement). 
 14 Lubben, Corporate Reorganization, supra note 7, at 79. The study “capture[d] professional fees 
incurred during the study period, even if approved or requested outside of the stud[y] period.” Id. at 85–86. 
 15 See id. at 87–88 (discussing the censoring issue).  
 16 73.2% of the cases in the dataset are coded with Bloomberg information. 
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With these changes, the dataset is now comprised of ninety-seven chapter 
11 cases filed in 2004. 
* * * 
Bankruptcy financial advisors come in two broad types.17 First, there are 
investment banker-type advisors, who either help market (i.e., find a buyer for) 
the debtor or advise the debtor on business changes going forward.18 In 
addition to a debtor, a committee can also retain an investment banker-type 
advisor to provide advice about the debtor’s business prospects and the 
financial terms of the proposed plan. Second, there are accounting firms that 
act as financial advisors. They typically provide similar business advice to the 
debtor or the committee that retains them, but they are less likely to engage in 
direct efforts to sell the debtor.19 In addition, both types of financial advisors 
typically present valuation evidence at a hearing to consider a reorganization 
plan for the debtor.20 
Somewhat related to financial advisors are turnaround consultants.21 These 
are professionals retained by the debtor. Like financial advisors, they provide 
business advice to the debtor—indeed, some of the same firms act as financial 
 
 17 See LOPUCKI & DOHERTY, supra note 5, at 90–93.  
 18 Until 2005, these firms were typically not large, well-known American investment banks, as the 
Bankruptcy Code expressly precluded retention of an investment banker that had been an underwriter for the 
debtor’s securities. See Miriam F. Miquelon-Weismann, Selling Out Corporate Reform: Eliminating The 
“Disinterested Person” Requirement for Investment Bankers Advising Chapter 11 Debtors, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
BUS. 731, 736–47 (2006) (discussing the history of investment banker retention); Nancy B. Rapoport, Enron 
and the New Disinterestedness—The Foxes are Guarding the Henhouse, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 521 
(2005) (discussing the 2005 change to the Code). In addition, it should be noted that financial advisors retained 
in chapter 11 cases only rarely underwrite securities offerings, so some would argue they are not actually 
“investment bankers.”  
 19 See Oscar Couwenberg & Stephen J. Lubben, The Costs of Chapter 11 in Context: American and 
Dutch Business Bankruptcy, 85 AM. BANKR. L.J. 63, 76 (2011) (describing the wide variety of professionals 
retained by debtors, including accounting firms who act as financial advisors); see also U.S. Trustee v. Price 
Waterhouse, 19 F.3d 138, 139 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he debtors filed applications to employ Price Waterhouse as 
their accountant and financial advisor.”). 
 20 For example, in all chapter 11 cases, the debtor is required to prove that creditors are receiving at least 
as much as they would in a hypothetical chapter 7 liquidation. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(ii) (2006). This 
frequently involves hiring experts to create a liquidation analysis and present it at the hearing. See id. See 
generally Peter V. Pantaleo & Barry W. Ridings, Reorganization Value, 51 BUS. LAW. 419 (1996) (outlining 
techniques frequently used by valuation experts in bankruptcy cases). 
 21 The only other study of financial advisors in chapter 11 includes turnaround consultants among its 
definition of financial advisors. Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Rise of the Financial Advisors: An 
Empirical Study of the Division of Professional Fees in Large Bankruptcies, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 141, 142 
(2008). 
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advisors when retained by a committee.22 These turnaround consultants 
typically become more involved in the direct management of the debtor, often 
taking positions within the debtor’s senior management.23 In some instances, 
the retention of these firms is mandated by a senior lender or the lead lender 
for the banks in the debtor’s secured credit facility.24 Appointment of a 
turnaround firm and a member of that firm as “chief restructuring officer” is 
sometimes the price for obtaining additional financing during a chapter 11 
case.25 In other cases, a turnaround firm, despite its hopeful title, manages a 
remnant debtor following its asset sale, liquidating unsold assets and working 
toward a plan that will distribute the sale proceeds. 26 
In the present dataset, there were thirty-three turnaround firms retained 
across thirty chapter 11 cases. That is, three debtors each retained two 
turnaround firms, while twenty-seven debtors each retained a single turnaround 
firm. Thirty-three fee applications are often an insufficient number to analyze 
separately, but given the somewhat unique role these professionals play in 
chapter 11 cases, it warrants accounting for their presence when considering 
the topic of financial advisors, broadly defined. 
 
 
 22 Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate 
Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209, 1234 (2006) (noting that Alvarez & Marsal serves as both an advisor to 
creditors and as a turnaround consultant). 
 23 Id. at 1233. 
 24 Id.  
 25 Id. 
 26 Such a turnaround firm is working on the remainders of Lehman Brothers. See Nelson D. Schwartz & 
Julie Creswell, Who Knew Bankruptcy Paid So Well?, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/05/02/business/02workout.html. 
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II. PREVALENCE & COST OF FINANCIAL ADVISORS 
As shown in Figure 1, almost 70% of the debtors in the dataset, or sixty-
seven of ninety-seven debtors, retain at least one financial advisor or 
turnaround consultant; an almost equal number retain more than one. Eleven 
debtors retained a turnaround consultant but no financial advisor. In the 
dataset, seventy-four of the ninety-seven cases have at least one committee. In 
fifty-seven of these cases, the committees retained at least one financial 
advisor. 
Table 2 shows the relationship between retention of financial advisors by 
the debtor and its committees. Note that zero committee retentions in this 
Table can either mean there was no committee, which happened in twenty-two 
cases, or the committee retained no financial advisors, which happened in 
eighteen cases; combining the two yields the forty total cases seen in the Table. 
Other than bankruptcies with no financial advisors or turnaround consultants 
involved in the case whatsoever, the next most likely outcome is for the debtor 
and committee to each retain one financial advisor or turnaround consultant, 
followed closely by one committee retention and two debtor retentions. 
 
Table 2: Number of Financial Advisors & Turnaround 
Consultants 
 Retained by committees in case 
Retained by debtor in case 0 1 2 Total 
0 24 6 0 30 
1 12 22 3 37 
2 4 19 3 26 
3 0 2 2 4 
Total 40 49 8 97 
 
In eleven cases there was more than one committee appointed. In all of 
these cases the committees retained at least one financial advisor; in six cases 
they retained two, most often with each committee retaining its own financial 
advisor. Multiple retentions of financial advisors by debtors do not seem to 
turn on the number of committees. For example, there are twenty-six cases 
with no committees appointed, yet in which the debtor retained two or more 
financial advisors. 
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If we limit our focus to the first committee appointed in the case—typically 
the basic unsecured creditors’ committee—that committee retained a single 
financial advisor in fifty-one cases, whereas it retained two financial advisors 
in four cases. 
Financial advisors, including turnaround consultants, are less likely to be 
retained by debtors in the smallest quartile of cases in the dataset. As shown in 
Table 2A, it also appears that multiple retentions are less likely to occur with 
respect to the smaller debtors.27 
 
Table 2A: Combined Debtor and Committee Financial 
Advisor and Turnaround Consultant Retentions, by Debtor 
Size 
 Number retained in case 
Debtor size by quartile 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
 (smallest) 1 8 3 1 0 0 0 12 
2 7 7 4 1 1 1 21 
3 3 7 9 3 0 0 22 
4 4 4 10 1 2 0 21 
Total 22 21 24 5 3 1 76 
Cases with no retentions omitted       
 
Table 3 shows the typical cost for financial advisors and turnaround 
consultants. For the sixty-six cases with at least one financial advisor or 
turnaround consultant, the extra cost associated with these professionals 
averages $2.9 million, with a median cost of $1.6 million.28 The debtor spends 
much more on these professionals than committees, with the average debtor 
spending $2.5 million as compared with $862,000 for committees. In other 
words, debtors spend an average of about three times more than committees do 
on these professionals.29 
  
 
 27 Cases with no financial advisors are omitted from Table 2A to reduce the number of cells and increase 
readability. Tables 2 and 2A will not match up exactly, since Table 2A includes cases without committees, 
while Table 2 excludes cases without committees. 
 28 The number of retained professionals in the following tables is somewhat less than the total number of 
retentions discussed earlier, because fee applications are missing from some case dockets. That is, I know a 
financial advisor or turnaround consultant was retained in some cases, but I do not know how much they were 
paid. 
 29 Debtors spend 2.6 times more than committees on a median basis. 
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Table 3: Cost of Financial Advisors and Turnaround Consultants 
  
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max 
Debtor FA 51 $1,966,577 $2,296,789 $1,406,436 $3,232 $10,400,000 
Debtor TC 23 $2,113,132 $3,232,314 $1,010,300 $152,948 $15,800,000 
Debtor 
Total 
59 $2,523,684 $3,767,882 $1,512,281 $3,875 $24,500,000 
Committee 
FA 







66 $2,948,628 $4,206,185 $1,615,799 $3,875 $26,900,000 
 
As shown in the top graph of Figure 4, in cases with both financial advisors 
and turnaround consultants, these professionals constitute the largest cost after 
debtor’s counsel, although the very small number of such cases suggests the 
need for caution. One cannot be entirely sure a sample size of twenty-seven is 
representative. As also shown in the same graph, these professionals combined 
with bankruptcy counsel for the debtor and committee to make up more than 
71% of the case’s overall cost. Turnaround consultants account for 17.27% of 
total cost, while financial advisors account for 17.05% of total cost. 
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The bottom graph of Figure 4 shows all cases with financial advisors, 
regardless of whether there was a turnaround consultant. In this larger group, 
financial advisors account for 18.2% of average cost, and together with the 
attorneys and turnaround consultants, these three groups of professionals 
represent almost 60% of the average total cost of chapter 11 cases. Financial 
advisors, although receiving much attention and criticism, actually cost slightly 
less, on average, than debtors’ bankruptcy attorneys. 
The remaining 40% of professionals are comprised of a variety of lawyers, 
accountants, and other professionals. Some, like appraisers and real estate 
professionals, may be directly involved in the bankruptcy. Meanwhile, others 
may be exogenous to the bankruptcy process, like lawyers handling a specific 
piece of nonbankruptcy litigation or auditors that would have been retained 
even if there had never been a bankruptcy case. In the latter case, the 
professionals earn too much compensation to be retained under an “ordinary 
course professionals” motion.30 
III.  MODELING THE COST OF FINANCIAL ADVISORS 
In the only other attempt to model financial advisors’ costs in chapter 11, 
LoPucki & Doherty (2008) found that debtor size, filing in Delaware or New 
York, and the number of financial advisors retained in a case were the key 
factors (p<0.05) in predicting total financial advisor cost.31 The authors also 
found that retention of KPMG LLP as a financial consultant reduced overall 
cost, although the implications of this finding are not discussed in their 
article.32 
I begin by testing the LoPucki & Doherty (2008) model on my data, using 
the same factors save for KPMG retention. In LoPucki & Doherty (2008), 
these factors were positively related to total financial advisor cost, although 
 
 30 Martin J. Bienenstock et al., Response to “Routine Illegality in Bankruptcy Court, Big-Case Fee 
Practices,” 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 549, 574 (2009) (“‘Ordinary course professionals’ are professionals paid less 
than a fixed amount in a given month and with whom debtors frequently have prepetition, sometimes quite 
long-standing relationships for services unrelated to the debtor’s Chapter 11 case.”). In larger cases, it has 
become common to excuse nonbankruptcy “ordinary course” professionals from the formal retention and fee 
approval system, although this practice is the subject of some controversy. See Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. 
Doherty, Routine Illegality in Bankruptcy Court, Big-Case Fee Practices, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 423, 430–43 
(2009); see also Bienenstock et al., supra, at 574–76. 
 31 LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 21, at 160–62 & tbl.10. The authors also found that their “trend” 
variable was significant (p < 0.01). Id. at 160. The material presented in LoPucki & Doherty (2008) also 
appears with some modifications and revisions in LOPUCKI & DOHERTY, supra note 5. 
 32 See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 21, at 162 tbl.10. 
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time spent in chapter 11 was not significant.33 The authors reported that their 
model resulted in an adjusted R-squared of 0.68.34 
However, when applied to the present dataset, the LoPucki & Doherty 
(2008) model achieves an adjusted R-squared (0.431). The two jurisdictional 
variables are not significant. 
In Table 5, I develop my own models. In the first model, I consider debtor 
size. This should positively relate to cost, but consistent with my prior studies 
on chapter 11 costs, I would expect debtor size to decrease in import as the 
models begin to address complexity and other factors more directly.35 
In the second model, I add a proxy for complexity—namely, a dummy 
variable that indicates whether a claims agent was used in the case. This too 
should positively correlate with cost. 
In the third model, I add a dummy variable that indicates if both the debtor 
and the committees had at least one financial advisor. This reflects the insight 
from Table 5.1, which shows that there is often a kind of parallelism between 
debtor and committee retention of financial advisors. Thus, this variable 
indicates whether this kind of joint retention is present. 
 
Table 5.1: Number of Financial Advisors Retained 
Committees 
Debtor None 1 or more Total 
None 26 15 41 
1 or more 14 42 56 
Total 40 57 97 
In the final model, I add the number of fee objections in the case to this 
model, log transformed and mean centered—that is, the mean is subtracted 
from every value.36 I use this variable as an index of how contentious the case 
is, theorizing that these cases might be more likely to result in valuation 
disputes and other litigation over the financial advisors’ work. The large lump 
sum fees that financial advisors and turnaround consultants receive might 
 
 33 Id. at 160–62 & tbl.10. 
 34 Id. at 162 tbl.10. 
 35 See Stephen J. Lubben, What We ‘Know’ About Chapter 11 Cost is Wrong, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & 
FIN. L. (forthcoming 2011); Lubben, Corporate Reorganization, supra note 7, at 106, 110. 
 36 Log of a zero value is undefined. To account for the number of cases with zero objections, I also add a 
constant (0.001) to the total number of objections in all cases. 
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make them the likely targets of a case with more fee objections.37 And 
financial advisors typically pass on the cost of defending their retention and 
compensation in bankruptcy court, which means that a more contentious case 
will result in another layer of attorneys’ fees paid through the financial 
advisor’s fee applications.38 By mean-centering the variable, the coefficient 
can now be interpreted as indicating the extra cost associated with above-
average “contentiousness.” Cases with less-than-average contentiousness will 
have a negative value in this variable, which, combined with the positive 
coefficient shown in Table 5, results in lower overall financial advisor costs. 
Throughout this Article, I adjust the standard errors to account for 
potential, unseen correlations among cases within the same judicial district 
(i.e., clustered standard errors). 
The final model explains 64.4% of the variance in total financial advisor 
and turnaround consultant costs, comparable to the models described in 
LoPucki & Doherty (2008).39 The joint retention of financial advisors, case 
complexity, and the contentiousness of the case are all significant factors in the 
cost, after accounting for size and complexity. 
The first two models, which involve size and complexity, explain very 
little, suggesting that most of the work is done by the variables added in the 
last two models. 
IV.  DEBTORS’ FINANCIAL ADVISORS & TURNAROUND CONSULTANTS 
As noted, the bulk of the cost associated with financial advisors comes 
from the debtor’s side of the case. Similarly, turnaround consultants are a 
debtor-only phenomenon. Accordingly, I use this section to explore an 
extension of the model developed in Table 5 to the specific issue of debtor 
financial advisors and turnaround consultants. 
  
 
 37 See In re Mirant Corp., 354 B.R. 113, 127 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006). 
 38 In re Borders Grp., Inc., No. 11-10614, 2011 WL 3678171 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2011). 
 39 See supra text accompanying note 31. 
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Observations 66 66 66 66 
R2 0.246 0.390* 0.567*** 0.644*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; SE adjusted for clustering by 
district; mean VIF (model 4) 1.21 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Table 6: Number of Debtor Financial Advisors and 
Turnaround Consultants 
 Financial Advisors 
Turnaround Consultants 0 1 2 3 Total 
0 29 25 12 1 67 
1 10 15 2 0 27 
2 2 1 0 0 3 
Total 41 41 14 1 97 
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Table 6 shows that although turnaround consultants and financial advisors 
are often retained by the same debtor, the two are largely independent. In 
twelve cases there were turnaround consultants without financial advisors; in 
thirty-eight cases there were financial advisors without turnaround consultants; 
in thirteen cases there were multiple financial advisors without any turnaround 
consultants. And in twenty-nine cases the debtor retained neither. 
I model debtor financial advisor cost (Model 1) and the combined cost of 
debtor financial advisors and turnaround consultants (Model 2) in Table 7. In 
both cases I use a modified version of the final model from Table 5, accounting 
for the change in dependent variables, which no longer includes committee 
financial advisors. 
In particular, I enter measures of size, a proxy for complexity, and the 
measure of case contentiousness, the mean-centered number of fee objections 
in the case. I also use the dummy variable that indicates the retention of one or 
more turnaround consultants. In addition, in these models I use a variable that 
indicates if a committee was appointed in the case and another that counts the 
number of debtor financial advisors. I hypothesize that all variables should be 
positively related to cost in either model. 
The first model considers the cost of debtor financial advisors alone. Size, 
case contentiousness (number of fee objections), and appointment of a 
committee are the key factors in this model. Interestingly, the number of debtor 
financial advisors is not significant, which suggests that it does not matter if 
the work is divided among multiple financial advisors. The appointment of a 
turnaround consultant is also not significant, suggesting that the cost of 
financial advisors is somewhat independent from the appointment of these 
related professionals. 
The second model follows the LoPucki & Doherty (2008) approach and 
considers the two types of debtor professionals in the aggregate, using a single 
model. The turnaround advisor variable is now significant, which is to be 
expected as the difference in the two dependent variables is the turnaround 
consultant cost. 
Interestingly, in both models size is significant again. This may suggest a 
debtor-specific effect that was hidden when considering the joint cost of 
financial advisors in Table 5. For example, there may be an unmodeled 
element of complexity here—larger debtors may engage their financial 
advisors in different ways than smaller debtors. 
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Table 7: Models of Debtor Financial Advisor & Turnaround Consultant Cost 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Log of Debtor 
FA cost 
Log of Debtor TC & 
FA cost 
Log of debtor size 0.435** 0.363*** 
 (0.142) (0.0737) 
Claims agent 0.119 0.169 
 (0.217) (0.150) 
Number of debtor FAs  -0.102 -0.0252 
 (0.176) (0.131) 
Turnaround consultant 0.0654 0.327* 
 (0.250) (0.157) 
Log of objs, mean 
centered 
0.143*** 0.134*** 
 (0.0353) (0.0352) 
Committee 0.834* 0.670* 
 (0.327) (0.281) 
Constant 1.540 2.139** 
 (0.925) (0.599) 
Observations 49 57 
R2 0.691 0.681 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; SE adjusted for clustering by district; 
mean VIF 1.48 and 1.27, respectively. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
V. FINANCIAL ADVISORS & TURNAROUND CONSULTANTS IN CHAPTER 11 
The foregoing analysis highlights the importance of financial advisors and 
turnaround consultants in modern chapter 11 practice. A sample of cases filed 
in 2011 would undoubtedly show even more prevalence of these types of 
professionals.40 Nonetheless, these sorts of professionals were largely 
unknown when the Bankruptcy Code’s professional retention and 
compensation provisions were drafted in the late 1970s.41 
 
 40 See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 21, at 162–63 & tbl.11 (showing number of financial advisors 
increases with the assets of the debtor and the number of days spent in bankruptcy). 
 41 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 327–328, 330–331 (2006) (making no mention of financial advisors in the Code’s 
retention and compensation provisions). Remember, of course, that the Code as enacted in 1978 continued the 
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Thus, while § 328 allows some degree of flexibility with regard to the 
terms of retention, many still envision all bankruptcy professionals billing by 
the hour and keeping the corresponding time records.42 Financial advisors 
work with a different model that involves higher risk and correspondingly 
higher reward.43 They do not fit neatly into the existing Bankruptcy Code 
scheme. 
Perhaps nowhere is this friction better illustrated than in the confusion 
surrounding § 328(a).44 Many courts read this provision as limiting their ability 
to review compensation under § 330 at the end of a case.45 For a financial 
advisor who may be compensated, at least in part, by a large success fee at the 
end of the case, the temptation to reconsider that success fee with the benefit of 
hindsight, and the knowledge of precisely how much it will be, may 
overwhelm the commitment to the fee that occurred at the start of the case.46 
Accordingly, courts have developed a number of elaborate rules regarding 
the invocation of § 328(a).47 None of these rules finds much support in the 
 
New Deal suspicion of most large investment bankers, a prohibition largely removed by the 2005 
Amendments to the Code. See id. § 101(14) (lacking prior restrictions on participation of investment bankers 
as “disinterested person[s]”); see also id. § 101(14)(B)–(E) (2000) (amended 2005) (containing significant 
restrictions on involvement of investment bankers as disinterested persons); Miquelon-Weismann, supra note 
18, at 736–47, 755–56 (2006) (discussing the history of the “categorical disqualification” of prepetition 
investment bankers as “disinterested persons” prior to 2005).  
 42 For example, in their recent book, LoPucki and Doherty frequently complain that some courts do not 
require such record keeping. LOPUCKI & DOHERTY, supra note 5, at xxiii. 
 43 See In re Bigler, LP, 422 B.R. 638, 641–42 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2010). 
 44 11 U.S.C. § 328(a) (“The trustee, or a committee appointed under section 1102 of this title, with the 
court’s approval, may employ or authorize the employment of a professional person under section 327 or 1103 
of this title, as the case may be, on any reasonable terms and conditions of employment, including on a 
retainer, on an hourly basis, on a fixed or percentage fee basis, or on a contingent fee basis. Notwithstanding 
such terms and conditions, the court may allow compensation different from the compensation provided under 
such terms and conditions after the conclusion of such employment, if such terms and conditions prove to have 
been improvident in light of developments not capable of being anticipated at the time of the fixing of such 
terms and conditions.”). 
 45 See Diana G. Adams & Roberta A. DeAngelis, Does “Improvident” Mean “Immutable”?: The 
Standard of Review for Advisors’ Professional Fees, AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2009, at 18, 78–79 
(“Investment bankers have historically sought employment under terms and conditions that fixed their 
compensation, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 328(a).”). 
 46 See, e.g., In re Mirant Corp., 354 B.R. 113, 128–29 & n.35 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006). 
 47 For example, several courts have required varying degrees of “flag waiving” when a professional seeks 
to invoke the terms of § 328(a). See, e.g., Nischwitz v. Miskovic (In re Airspect Air, Inc.), 385 F.3d 915, 921–
22 (6th Cir. 2004) (requiring pre-approval of retention under § 328(a)); Circle K Corp. v. Houlihan, Lokey, 
Howard & Zukin, Inc. (In re Circle K Corp.), 279 F.3d 669, 671 (9th Cir. 2001) (amended Jan. 30, 2002) 
(“[U]nless a professional’s retention application unambiguously specifies that it seeks approval under § 328, it 
is subject to review under § 330.”); Zolfo, Cooper & Co. v. Sunbeam-Oster Co., 50 F.3d 253, 261 (3d Cir. 
1995) (“‘If the order does not expressly and unambiguously state specific terms and conditions (e.g., specific 
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actual text of the Code. On the other hand, professionals sometimes speak of 
retention “under” § 328(a), as if this were a separate provision of the Code that 
would allow professionals to bypass the general scheme set forth in §§ 327 and 
330.48 But surely this is an impossibility, given § 328(a)’s express reference to 
§ 327.49 In short, the caselaw analysis of the interrelationship between 
§§ 327(a), 328(a), and 330 is nothing short of an intellectual mess. 
Section 328(a) should be involved in every retention application, inasmuch 
as retention involves not only checking for the kind of conflicts prohibited by 
§ 327(a), but also considering whether the terms of the engagement are 
reasonable. It is this latter factor that invokes § 328(a), whether the parties or 
the court expressly mention it in the retention order. 
In the case of attorneys, it is easy to understand the distinction between pre-
retention analysis under § 328(a) and post-retention analysis under § 330.50 In 
short, § 328 involves whether the proposed hourly rate is reasonable,51 while 
§ 330 involves consideration of whether the number of hours actually billed 
was reasonable.52 The court approves the rate at the point of retention and the 
 
hourly rates or contingency fee arrangements) that are being approved pursuant to the first sentence of 
[§] 328(a), then the terms and conditions are merely those that apply in the absence of specific agreement. That 
leaves the court free to apply lodestar rates unfettered by the strictures of the second sentence of [§] 328(a).’” 
(quoting In re C & P Auto Transp., Inc., 94 B.R. 682, 685 n.4 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1988))). 
 48  Courts also add to the confusion. Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette Secs. Corp. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co. (In re 
Nat’l Gypsum Co.), 123 F.3d 861, 862 (5th Cir. 1997) (suggesting § 328 as a way to avoid § 330); Nischwitz 
v. Airspect Air, Inc. (In re Airspect Air, Inc.), 288 B.R. 464, 470 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2003) (“The widely accepted 
general rule is that bankruptcy courts, once having approved the employment under § 328, may not later 
switch to § 330 to award fees.”), rev’d on other grounds, 385 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2004); In re Westbrooks, 202 
B.R. 520, 522 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996) (“If the bankruptcy court pre-approves the terms of the appointment, it 
does not have the power to make a ‘reasonableness’ review.”). 
 49 See 11 U.S.C. § 328(a) (“The trustee, . . . with the court’s approval, may employ or authorize the 
employment of a professional person under [§] 327 or 1103 of this title . . . .”). 
 50 See Riker, Danzig, Scherer, Hyland & Perretti v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Smart 
World Techs., LLC), 552 F.3d 228, 233–34 (2d Cir. 2009) (drawing such a distinction). 
 51 See 11 U.S.C. § 328(a). 
 52 Section 330, which governs compensation of officers such as professionals, provides in pertinent part: 
(3) In determining the amount of reasonable compensation to be awarded to an examiner, trustee 
under chapter 11, or professional person, the court shall consider the nature, the extent, and the 
value of such services, taking into account all relevant factors, including— 
(A) the time spent on such services; 
(B) the rates charged for such services; 
(C) whether the services were necessary to the administration of, or beneficial at the time at 
which the service was rendered toward the completion of, a case under this title; 
(D) whether the services were performed within a reasonable amount of time commensurate 
with the complexity, importance, and nature of the problem, issue, or task addressed; 
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total number of hours at the point of the fee application.53 The only instance in 
which this division breaks down is when the rates previously approved must be 
reconsidered because they prove to be “improvident in light of developments 
not capable of being anticipated at the time of the fixing of such [rates].”54 
However, this scheme does not work very well when applied to a lump sum 
bonus paid at the end of a case. The bonus is an abstraction at the start of the 
case, a percentage of an unknown number that will be paid at some unknown 
point the future, and at the end of the case there is no way to reasonably 
untangle the two types of reasonableness review.55 Reviewing the bonus for its 
reasonableness under § 330 inevitably impinges on issues that should have 
been settled under the structure set up by §§ 327 and 328.56 
Given the data presented in this paper, it seems that it is time to resolve 
these important questions through a general reconsideration of the Code’s 
provisions regarding professional retention. 
CONCLUSION 
Studies of chapter 11 fees in the aggregate, and the chapter 11 fees of 
attorneys in particular, are common.57 This Article examines the other big 
source of professional costs in chapter 11: financial advisors and the subsidiary 
group of professionals known as turnaround consultants. Almost 70% of the 
debtors, or sixty-seven of ninety-seven debtors, in the dataset retain at least one 
financial advisor or turnaround consultant, and an almost equal number retain 
more than one. Many committees also retained financial advisors. 
 
(E) with respect to a professional person, whether the person is board certified or otherwise 
has demonstrated skill and experience in the bankruptcy field; and 
(F) whether the compensation is reasonable based on the customary compensation charged 
by comparably skilled practitioners in cases other than cases under this title. 
Id. § 330(3). 
 53 See id. §§ 328(a), 330(a)(3). 
 54 Id. § 328(a). 
 55 See In re XO Commc’n, Inc. 323 B.R. 330, 339 n.11 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting the court had 
approved the financial advisors’ monthly fees under § 328(a), but not the “success fee,” leaving the court free 
to consider the latter under § 330). 
 56 And thus leading to the confusion seen in cases like Committee of Equity Security Holders of Federal-
Mogul Corp. v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re Federal Mogul-Global, Inc.), 348 F.3d 390 
(3d Cir. 2003), in which § 328(a) was held to constrain the ex post analysis under § 330. Comm. of Equity Sec. 
Holders of Fed.-Mogul Corp. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Fed. Mogul-Global, Inc.), 348 
F.3d 390, 396–403 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 57 See Nancy B. Rapoport, Rethinking Professional Fees in Chapter 11 Cases, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 263, 
272–76 (2010) (reviewing the studies). 
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For the sixty-six cases with at least one financial advisor or turnaround 
consultant, the extra cost associated with these averages $2.9 million, with a 
median cost of $1.6 million. The debtor spends much more on these 
professionals than committees, with the average debtor spending $2.5 million 
as compared to $862,000 for committees. In other words, debtors are spending 
an average of about three times as much as committees on these professionals. 
Perhaps most importantly, this Article shows that the joint retention of 
financial advisors by the debtor and the committee results in increased cost. 
The Bankruptcy Code as currently written has but limited capacity to adapt 
to these new developments. It is time for an update. 
